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Abstract
With high scalability, high video streaming quality, and low bandwidth requirement, peer-to-peer
(P2P) systems have become a popular way to exchange files and deliver multimedia content over the
internet. However, current P2P systems are suffering from “free-riding” due to the peers’ selfish nature.
In this paper, we propose a credit-based incentive mechanism to encourage peers to cooperate with each
other in a heterogeneous network consisting of wired and wireless peers. The proposed mechanism
can provide differentiated service to peers with different credits through biased resource allocation.
A Stackelberg game is formulated to obtain the optimal pricing and purchasing strategies, which can
jointly maximize the revenue of the uploader and the utilities of the downloaders. In particular, peers’
heterogeneity and selfish nature are taken into consideration when designing the utility functions for
the Stackelberg game. It is shown that the proposed resource allocation scheme is effective in providing
service differentiation for peers and stimulating them to make contribution to the P2P streaming system.
Index Terms
Game Thoery, Stackelberg Game, Network Optimization, Credit-based Incentive Mechanism, Peer-
to-Peer Networks, Heterogeneous Networks.
Part of the results of this paper have been presented in IEEE ICC 2013, Budapest, Hungary [1].
X. Kang and Y. Wu are with Institute for Infocomm Research, 1 Fusionopolis Way, ♯21-01 Connexis, South Tower, Singapore
138632. Email: {xkang, wydong}@i2r.a-star.edu.sg.
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING 2
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of peer-to-peer (P2P) communication technologies, P2P networks
have become a popular way to exchange files and deliver multimedia content over the internet
due to their low bandwidth requirement, good video streaming quality, and high flexibility.
However, current P2P systems greatly rely on volitionary resource contribution from individual
peers and do not enforce any compulsory contribution from these peers. This directly leads to the
well-known “free-riding” problem, which refers to the phenomenon that a peer consumes free
service provided by other peers without contributing any its resources to the P2P network. This
tremendously degrades the performance of P2P systems, especially P2P multimedia streaming
systems which have high requirements on time delay and data rate. Free-riding is common in
P2P networks due to peers’ selfish nature and the limited network resources. Most peers only
want to maximize their own benefits without caring about the overall performance of the whole
P2P community. It is reported in [2] that more than 70% P2P users do not share any file in
Gnutella system. Therefore, to enhance the performance of P2P networks, effective incentive
mechanisms need to be put in place to stimulate the cooperation between peers and encourage
them to make contribution to the P2P system.
On the other hand, recent advances in wireless communications technologies (3G/4G networks)
and smart phones have enabled the development of mobile version of P2P applications for smart
phones, such as PPtv [3] and PPStream [4]. People use these mobile P2P applications to watch
movies, watch dramas, or listen to music when traveling on buses and metros. Due to the
convenience, mobile P2P users are increasing dramatically nowadays. As compared to the wired
P2P users, mobile P2P users are more selfish due to the high cost of mobile data. Thus, there is
also a compelling need to design effective incentive mechanisms for mobile P2P applications.
The existing incentive mechanisms for P2P systems are mainly designed to work in wired
networks. For the heterogeneous networks with both wired and wireless nodes, these incentive
mechanisms may not work well due to the differences between the wired nodes and the wireless
nodes. For example, the computing capability of the wireless nodes (such as smart phones
and tablet PCs) is usually weaker than that of the wired nodes (such as desktop PCs, and
workstations). Thus, incentive mechanisms with high complexity may not be suitable for mobile
applications. It is true that there exist high-end smartphones with high-end four-core or eight-
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core processors. However, incentive mechanisms with high complexity are still not preferred on
these mobile devices since the high complexity computing can drain out the devices’ batteries
fast. In addition, the connection bandwidth of the wireless nodes is usually less than that of the
wired nodes. This should be taken into consideration when designing the incentive mechanism
to achieve relative fairness. However, to the best of our knowledge, most of the existing work
fails to do this. All these differences between the wireless and wired nodes pose new challenges
to the design of the incentive mechanism for the heterogeneous networks.
In this paper, we propose a credit-based incentive mechanism for heterogeneous networks
with both wired and wireless nodes. We consider a P2P streaming network where each peer
can serve as an uploader and a downloader at the same time. When a peer uploads data chunks
to other peers, it can earn certain credits for providing the service. When a peer downloads
data chunks from other peers, it has to pay certain credits for consuming the resource. A peer’s
net contribution to the network is reflected by its accumulated credits. A Stackelberg game is
formulated to provide differentiated service to peers with different credits. Particularly, peers’
heterogeneity and selfish nature are taken into consideration when designing the utility functions.
The main contributions and key results of this paper are summarized as follows.
• A credit-based incentive mechanism based on Stackelberg games is proposed for P2P
streaming networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that applies the
Stackelberg game to the incentive mechanism design for P2P streaming networks.
• Peers’ heterogeneity is taken into consideration when designing the utility functions for the
Stackelberg game. Thus, our incentive mechanism can be applied to heterogeneous P2P
networks with wired and wireless peers having different connection bandwidths.
• The selfish nature of peers is taken into consideration when designing the utility functions for
the Stackelberg game, i.e., every peer is a strategic player with the aim to maximize its own
benefit. This makes our incentive mechanism perform well in a P2P network environment
with non-altruistic peers.
• The optimal pricing strategies for the uploader and the optimal purchasing strategies for the
downloader are both derived. The Stackelberg equilibrium is then obtained and shown to
be unique and Pareto-optimal.
• Two fully distributed implementation schemes are proposed based on the obtained theoretical
results. It is shown that each of these schemes has its own advantages.
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• The impact of peer churn on the proposed incentive mechanism is analyzed. It is shown
that the proposed mechanism can adapt to dynamic events such as peers joining or leaving
the network.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. In Sections II and III, we present
the related work and describe our system model. In Sections IV and V, we present the problem
formulation and its optimal solution. In Sections VI and VII, we propose two implementation
schemes and study the impact of peer churn on the proposed schemes. Numerical results are
given in Section VIII to evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes. Then, we discuss
some possible extensions of this work in Section IX. Section X concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A simple incentive mechanism for P2P systems is the “tit-for-tat” strategy, where peers receive
only as much as they contribute. A free rider that does not upload data chunks to other peers
cannot get data chunks from them and suffers from poor streaming quality. Due to its simplicity
and fairness, this scheme has been adopted by BitTorrent [5]. Though this strategy can increase
the cooperation between peers to a certain level, it is shown in literature [6]–[8] that it may
perform poorly in today’s internet environment due to the asymmetry of the upload and download
bandwidths.
Unlike the “tit-for-tat” strategy, which enforces compulsory contribution from peers, another
category of incentive mechanisms stimulate peers to contribute to the system by indirect reci-
procity [9]–[17]. In these incentive mechanisms, the contribution of each peer is converted to a
score which is then used to determine the reputation or rank of the peer among all the peers in
the network. Peers with a high reputation are given a certain priority in utilizing the network
resources, such as selecting peers or desirable media data chunks. Therefore, peers with a high
reputation have more flexibility in choosing desired data suppliers and thus are more likely to
receive high-quality streaming. On the other hand, peers with a low reputation have quite limited
options in parent-selection and thus receive low-quality streaming. Through this way, the P2P
systems can provide differentiated service to peers with different reputation values. Hence, peers
are motivated to contribute more to the P2P system to earn a higher reputation.
Recently, game theory [18] is found to be a powerful tool to study strategic interactions among
rational peers and design incentive mechanisms to stimulate the cooperation among peers for
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P2P streaming systems. This is due to the fact that peers are selfish and strategic players in P2P
streaming systems. It is their inherent nature to maximize their payoffs while simultaneously
reducing their cost, i.e., enjoying a high quality streaming service while consuming least of their
own resource. Game theory has been widely used in studying strategic interactions among these
peers [19]–[29]. In [19]–[23], the authors discussed how to apply game theory to the design of
incentive mechanisms for P2P networks at a high level. It is pointed out that straightforward use
of results from traditional game theory do not fit well with the requirements of P2P networks.
The utility functions must be customized for P2P networks. In [24], a repeated static game
called Cournot Oligopoly game was formulated to model the interactions between peers, and
an incentive mechanism was proposed by analyzing and solving the game. In [25], a simple,
selfish, link-based incentive mechanism for unstructured P2P file sharing systems was proposed.
It was shown that a greedy approach is sufficient for the system to evolve into a “good” state
under the studied game model. In [26], an incentive mechanism was proposed for P2P networks
based on the Bayes game. In [27], an infinitely repeated game was formulated to analyze the
interactions between peers, and a so-called credit line mechanism was proposed to stimulate
cooperation between peers. In [28], based on the first-price auction procedure, a payment-
based incentive mechanism was proposed for P2P streaming networks. Whereas, in [29], a
non-cooperative competition game was used to provide service-differentiated resource allocation
between competing peers in a P2P network.
Different from these work, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first work that models
the peers’ interactions as a Stackelberg game. Particularly, we take the peers’ heterogeneity
(wired/wireless peers with different connection bandwidths) into consideration when designing
the utility functions for the Stackelberg game. Besides, two distributed implementations of
the mechanism with different complexity are proposed to handle the difference in computing
capability between wired and wireless nodes.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a P2P streaming network where all the peers can serve as the
uploader and the downloader at the same time. To eliminate the free-riding phenomenon and
encourage cooperation between peers, we introduce the concept of credit into the system, where
peers earn credits for providing service and consume credits for receiving service. We assume
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Fig. 1. System Model
that all the peers are selfish and rational. Their aim is to maximize the credits that they can earn
by fully utilizing their available network resource. Each peer has the right to set up a price for
the service that it provides based on its own benefits. For fairness considerations, we assume
that the uploader can only adopt the uniform pricing strategy, i.e., it cannot set different prices
for different peers for the same amount of bandwidth allocation.
In this paper, the credit of peer i is denoted by ci. The connection type (i.e., the download
capacity) of peer i is denoted by di. The download bandwidth allocation for peer i is denoted
by xi. The upload bandwidth of peer k is denoted by uk. We denote the set of peers that request
data chunks from peer k as Sk. To avoid trivial bandwidth allocation schemes, we assume that∑
i∈Sk
di > uk. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the downloaders send their credits and connection types
to the the uploader together with their data request. The uploader then decides the bandwidth
price and allocates the bandwidth to requesters based on their credits and connection types.
For example, suppose there are 100 peers requesting data chunks from peer i, but peer i can
only provide service to 20 peers at the same time due to its limited upload bandwidth. Then,
peer i can set up a high price that only 20 peers can accept, and the remaining 80 peers will
give up due to the high cost. Through this way, peers with more credits are actually given a
higher priority in utilizing network resources, and service differentiation for peers with different
credits is thus realized. In this paper, the above service differentiation scheme is realized by a
Stackelberg resource allocation game which is investigated in the following section.
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IV. STACKELBERG GAME FORMULATION
A Stackelberg game is a strategic game that consists of a leader and several followers
competing with each other on certain resources. The leader moves first and the followers
move subsequently. In this paper, we formulate the uploader that has media data chunks as
the leader, and the downloaders that request for media data chunks as the followers. The
uploader (leader) imposes a price on each unit of bandwidth providing to each downloader.
Then, the downloaders (followers) determine their optimal download bandwidths to maximize
their individual utilities based on the assigned bandwidth price. The Stackelberg Game consists of
two parts: the uploading game at the uploader side and the downloading game at the downloader
side, which are introduced in the following two subsections, respectively.
A. Uploading Game Design
Under the Stackelberg game model, for the uploader k, if we denote its price on each unit of
bandwidth providing to each downloader as µ, then its revenue maximization problem can be
formulated as
Uploading Game:
max
µ>0
∑
i∈Sk
µxi, (1)
s.t.
∑
i∈Sk
xi ≤ uk, (2)
where xi is the bandwidth that peer i intends to purchase, and xi is a function of the bandwidth
price µ, i.e., xi , fi(µ). Sk denotes the set of peers that request data chunks from peer k, and
uk is the total available upload bandwidth of peer k.
Under the Stackelberg game formulation, the amount of bandwidth that peer i intends to
purchase is decreasing in the bandwidth price µ. On the other hand, it is observed from (1)
that the revenue of the uploader is the sum of products of the bandwidth price and individual
peer’s purchased bandwidth. Therefore, the uploader must carefully design its bandwidth pricing
strategy in order to maximize its revenue.
B. Downloading Game Design
At the downloader side, for each peer i that requests data chunks from the uploader, the utility
maximization problem can be formulated as
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Downloading Game:
max
xi≥0
cisi − µxi, (3)
s.t. xi ≤ di, (4)
where si , log2
(
1 + xi
di
)
is the performance satisfaction factor for peer i, ci is the credits that
peer i has, and di is the maximum download bandwidth of peer i.
The performance satisfaction factor si reflects the degree of satisfaction or the “happines”
of the downloader under the received bandwidth xi. A log function is adopted to model this
factor due to the fact that log functions are shown in literature to be suitable to representing a
large class of elastic data traffics including the media streaming service [30], [31]. When the
received bandwidth xi = 0, the satisfaction factor si is equal to 0, which indicates that peer
i is unsatisfied with its system performance. On the other hand, when the received bandwidth
xi = di, the satisfaction factor si is equal to 1, which indicates that peer i is fully satisfied with
its system performance. The degree of satisfaction increases with the increase of the received
bandwidth xi.
It is also observed from (3) that the utility function of the downloader consist of two parts:
cisi and µxi. cisi is the credits that peer i is willing to pay for the service it received, while
µxi is the cost that peer i has to pay for obtaining the bandwidth xi. Obviously, with a larger
bandwidth xi, peer i can obtain more satisfactory system performance, and thus is willing to
pay more credits. On the other hand, the cost increases with the increase of the bandwidth xi.
Therefore, optimal strategies are needed for a rational peer to balance its cost and the achieved
system performance in order to maximize its utility.
C. Stackelberg Equilibrium
The uploading game and the downloading game together form a Stackelberg game. The
objective of this game is to find the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) point(s) from which neither
the leader nor the followers have incentives to deviate. For the proposed Stackelberg game, the
SE is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1: Let µ∗ be a solution for the uploading problem and x∗i be a solution for the
downloading game of the ith peer. Then, the point (µ∗,x∗) is a SE for the proposed Stackelberg
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING 9
game if for any (µ,x) with µ > 0 and x  0, the following conditions are satisfied:
Uup (µ∗,x∗) ≥ Uup (µ,x∗) , (5)
Udowni (x
∗
i , µ
∗) ≥ Udowni (xi, µ
∗) , ∀i, (6)
where Uup(·) and Udown(·) are the utilities of the uploading game and the downloading game,
respectively.
For the proposed game in this paper, the SE can be obtained as follows: For a given price µ,
the downloading game is solved first. Then, with the obtained best response functions x∗ of the
downloaders, we solve the uploading game for the optimal price µ∗.
V. OPTIMAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRATEGIES
In this section, we investigate the optimal resource allocation strategies for the proposed
Stackelberg game, i.e., the optimal bandwidth allocation for the downloading game and the
optimal pricing strategy for the uploading game.
A. Optimal Download Bandwidth
For a given µ, the optimal bandwidth x∗i for peer i is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1: For a given µ, the optimal solution for the downloading game is
x∗i =


di, if µ ≤ ci2di ln 2 ,
ci
µ ln 2
− di, if ci2di ln 2 < µ ≤
ci
di ln 2
,
0, if µ > ci
di ln 2
.
(7)
Proof: The Lagrangian of the downloading game can be written as
L(xi, α, β) = ci log2
(
1 +
xi
di
)
− µxi − α (xi − di) + βxi.
where α and β are the nonnegative dual variable associated with the constraints.
The dual function is q(α, β) = maxxi L(xi, α, β). The Lagrange dual problem is then given
by minα≥0,β≥0 q(α, β). The duality gap is zero for the convex problem addressed here, and thus
solving its dual problem is equivalent to solving the original problem. Thus, the optimal solutions
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needs to satisfy the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [32]:
di ≥ x
∗
i ≥ 0, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, (8)
α (x∗i − di) = 0, (9)
βx∗i = 0, (10)
∂L(x∗i , α, β)
∂x∗i
=
ci
(di + x
∗
i ) ln 2
− µ− α + β = 0. (11)
From (11), it follows
x∗i =
ci
(µ+ α− β) ln 2
− di. (12)
Suppose x∗i < di when µ ≤ ci2di ln 2 . Then, from (9), it follows α = 0. Therefore, (12) reduces
to x∗i =
ci
ln 2(µ−β)
−di. Then x∗i < di results in ci2di ln 2 < µ−β. Since β ≥ 0, it follows µ >
ci
2di ln 2
.
This contradicts the presumption. Therefore, from (9), it follows
x∗i = di, if µ ≤
ci
2di ln 2
. (13)
Similarly, we can prove that x∗i = 0, if µ > cidi ln 2 , and x
∗
i =
ci
µ ln 2
− di, if ci2di ln 2 < µ ≤
ci
di ln 2
.
Theorem 4.1 is thus proved.
Remark: It is observed from (7) that x∗i is a piecewise function of the price µ. If the price µ
is very high, the optimal download bandwidth x∗i for peer i is 0; if the price µ is very low, peer
i will download at its maximum bandwidth. In general, x∗i is a decreasing function of µ. This
indicates that the uploader can easily control the bandwidth allocated to peer i by controlling
the price µ assigned for peer i. Besides, some key observations obtained from (7) are listed as
follows.
• Under the same prescribed price µ, comparing with the same type (i.e., the same di) of peers
with higher contributions (i.e., more credits), low contributors are more likely to be rejected
from downloading. The uploader can easily reject a low contributor i from downloading by
setting a price larger than ci
di ln 2
.
• Under the same prescribed price µ, more bandwidth is allocated to the peer with higher
contributions for the same type of peer. High contributors are more likely to download at
their maximum download bandwidth.
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B. Optimal Pricing Strategy
With the results obtained in (7), we are now ready for solving the uploading game. Using
fi(µ) to denote the xi obtained in (7), the uploading game can be rewritten as
P1: max
µ>0
∑
i∈Sk
µfi(µ), (14)
s.t.
∑
i∈Sk
fi(µ) ≤ uk. (15)
The above problem is difficult to solve since fi(µ) is a piece-wise function of µ. Therefore,
to solve P1, we first consider the two-peer scenario, and then extend the results to the multi-peer
scenario.
1) Two-peer Scenario: In this scenario, we consider the case that only two peers request data
chunks from the uploader, and we assume that they are sorted in the order c1
d1
> c2
d2
. Then, the
thresholds given in (7) of the two peers may have the following two possible orders.
Case I: c1
d1 ln 2
> c2
d2 ln 2
> c1
2d1 ln 2
> c2
2d2 ln 2
.
Case II: c1
d1 ln 2
> c1
2d1 ln 2
> c2
d2 ln 2
> c2
2d2 ln 2
.
Before we start the analysis for the above two cases, the upper limit and the lower limit of
the optimal price µ∗ are given out in the following two propositions.
Proposition 4.1: The upper bound of µ∗ is c1
d1 ln 2
, i.e., Sup (µ∗) = c1
d1 ln 2
.
Proof: This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose the optimal µ∗ of P1 satisfies µ∗ ≥
c1
d1 ln 2
. Then, it follows that µ∗ ≥ c2
d2 ln 2
since c1
d1
> c2
d2
. According to (7), we have x1 = 0 and
x2 = 0. The resulting revenue for the uploader is zero. It is easy to see that we can find another
pricing strategy µ′ that satisfies µ′ < c1
d1 ln 2
and can generate a revenue larger than zero. This
contradicts with our presumption. Thus, µ∗ ≥ c1
d1 ln 2
does not hold. Therefore, µ∗ must be less
than c1
d1 ln 2
.
Proposition 4.2: The minimum value for µ∗ is c2
2d2 ln 2
, i.e., Min (µ∗) = c2
2d2 ln 2
.
Proof: It is observed from (7) that x1 = d1 and x2 = d2 if µ = c22d2 ln 2 . It is clear that x1
and x2 will not increase if the uploader sets a lower µ, which indicates that the uploader cannot
increase its revenue by setting a price lower than c2
2d2 ln 2
. Therefore, the minimum value for the
optimal price µ∗ is c2
2d2 ln 2
.
Now, we solve P1 for the two-peer scenario under the above two cases, respectively. First, we
consider Case I: c1
d1 ln 2
> c2
d2 ln 2
> c1
2d1 ln 2
> c2
2d2 ln 2
. To derive the optimal price µ∗, we consider
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the following three possible intervals.
• Case I-a: µ∗ ∈
[
c2
d2 ln 2
, c1
d1 ln 2
)
. In this case, based on (7), we have x1 = c1µ ln 2 − d1 and
x2 = 0. As a result, P1 is reduced to a convex optimization problem, and it can be solved
that µ∗ = c1
(uk+d1) ln 2
. Using the same approach as [33], it can be shown that µ∗ is the
optimal solution for P1 if and only if c2
d2 ln 2
≤ c1
(uk+d1) ln 2
< c1
d1 ln 2
, i.e., c1
c2/d2
− d1 ≥ uk > 0.
Thus, it follows that
µ∗ =
c1
(uk + d1) ln 2
, if c1
c2/d2
− d1 ≥ uk > 0. (16)
• Case I-b: µ∗ ∈
[
c1
2d1 ln 2
, c2
d2 ln 2
)
. In this case, based on (7), we have x1 = c1µ ln 2 − d1 and
x2 =
c2
µ ln 2
−d2. As a result, P1 becomes a convex optimization problem, and it can be solved
that µ∗ = c1+c2
(uk+d1+d2) ln 2
. Same as Case I-a, it can be shown that the obtained µ∗ is the optimal
solution for P1 if and only if c1
2d1 ln 2
≤ c1+c2
(uk+d1+d2) ln 2
< c2
d2 ln 2
, i.e., c1+c2
c1/2d1
− d1 − d2 ≥ uk >
c1+c2
c2/d2
− d1 − d2. Thus, it follows that
µ∗ =
c1 + c2
(uk + d1 + d2) ln 2
,
if c2
c1/2d1
+ d1 − d2 ≥ uk >
c1
c2/d2
− d1. (17)
• Case I-c: µ∗ ∈
[
c2
2d2 ln 2
, c1
2d1 ln 2
)
. In this case, based on (7), we have x1 = d1 and x2 =
c2
µ ln 2
− d2. Same as the previous two subcases, P1 is reduced to a convex problem, and it
follows that µ∗ = c2
(uk−d1+d2) ln 2
. It is the optimal solution for P1 if and only if c2
2d2 ln 2
≤
c2
(uk−d1+d2) ln 2
< c1
2d1 ln 2
, i.e., d1 + d2 ≥ uk > c2c1/2d1 + d1 − d2. Thus, it follows that
µ∗ =
c2
(uk − d1 + d2) ln 2
,
if d1 + d2 ≥ uk >
c2
c1/2d1
+ d1 − d2. (18)
Based on the above results, the optimal pricing strategy for the uploader under Case I can be
summarized as
µ∗=


c1
(uk+d1) ln 2
, if c1
c2/d2
− d1 ≥ uk > 0,
c1+c2
(uk+d1+d2) ln 2
, if c2
c1/2d1
+d1−d2≥ uk>
c1
c2/d2
−d1,
c2
(uk−d1+d2) ln 2
, if d1+d2 ≥ uk > c2c1/2d1 +d1−d2.
(19)
Remark: It is observed from (19) that the optimal price can be divided into three regions
based on the uploader’s available bandwidth. Based on the demand of the peers and the supply
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of the uploader, the three regions are named as insufficient region, balance region, and sufficient
region. In the insufficient region, the uploader’s bandwidth is not enough to support all the peers.
In this region, at least one peer will be not assigned any bandwidth. Peers are excluded from the
game based on their ci
di
values. Peers with low values are rejected first. For instance, in Case I-a,
peer 2 is rejected from the game and only peer 1 remains in the game. In the balance region,
the uploader will allocate bandwidth to each peer. However, none of the peers can download at
its maximum bandwidth di. In this region, the uploader allocates its limited bandwidth to the
peers proportional to their ci
di
values. In the sufficient region, the uploader’s bandwidth is able
to support both the peers, and at least one of them can download at its maximum download
bandwidth. The peer with the largest ci
di
will be the first peer that can download at its maximum
download bandwidth. When the bandwidth is sufficiently large, both peers can download at their
maximum download bandwidth. 
Now, we consider Case II: c1
d1 ln 2
> c1
2d1 ln 2
> c2
d2 ln 2
> c2
2d2 ln 2
. Similar as Case I, we consider
different intervals to find the optimal price µ∗ in each interval.
• Case II-a: µ∗ ∈
[
c1
2d1 ln 2
, c1
d1 ln 2
)
. In this case, based on (7), we have x1 = c1µ ln 2 − d1 and
x2 = 0. Same as Case I-a, P1 becomes a convex optimization problem, and it can be solved
that µ∗ = c1
(uk+d1) ln 2
. Using the same approach as [33], it can be shown that µ∗ is the
optimal solution for P1 if and only if c1
2d1 ln 2
≤ c1
(uk+d1) ln 2
< c1
d1 ln 2
, i.e., d1 ≥ uk > 0. Thus,
it follows that
µ∗ =
c1
(uk + d1) ln 2
, if d1 ≥ uk > 0. (20)
• Case II-b: µ∗ ∈
[
c2
d2 ln 2
, c1
2d1 ln 2
)
. In this case, we show that the maximum possible utility for
the uploader is lower than that obtained in Case II-a, and hence the optimal price will never
lie in this range. Based on (7), we have x1 = d1 and x2 = 0. P1 is thus reduced to finding
the maximum value of µd1, and is valid only when d1 ≤ uk. Since µ ∈
[
c2
d2 ln 2
, c1
2d1 ln 2
)
, the
upper bound of µd1 is c12 ln 2 . However, when d1 ≤ uk, it is observed from Case II-a that the
maximum revenue is µ∗
(
c1
µ∗ ln 2
− d1
)
, where µ∗ is given by (20). Thus, µ∗
(
c1
µ∗ ln 2
− d1
)
can be computed as c1uk
(uk+d1) ln 2
, which is larger than c1
2 ln 2
when d1 ≤ uk. Thus, µ∗ should
not lie in this range.
• Case II-c: µ∗ ∈
[
c2
2d2 ln 2
, c2
d2 ln 2
)
. In this case, based on (7), we have x1 = d1 and x2 =
c2
µ ln 2
− d2. It follows that µ∗ = c2(uk−d1+d2) ln 2 . It is the optimal solution for P1 if and only
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING 14
Determine 
order of 
thresholds
( , ),
i i
c d i∀
1 2
1 2
c c
d d
>
Case I
Case II
1 0kd u≥ >
1 2 1kd d u d+ ≥ >
1
1
2 2
0
/
k
c
d u
c d
− ≥ >
2 1
1 2 1
1 1 2 2
/ 2 /
k
c c
d d u d
c d c d
+ − ≥ > −
2
1 2 1 2
1 1
/ 2
k
c
d d u d d
c d
+ ≥ > + −
Determine
region of
k
u
Determine
region of
k
u
Sort peers:
1
1( )ln2k
c
u d+
1 2
1 2( )ln2k
c c
u d d
+
+ +
2
1 2( )ln2k
c
u d d− +
2
1 2( )ln2k
c
u d d− +
1
1( )ln2k
c
u d+
Collect
Fig. 2. Procedure of finding the optimal price for the two-peer scenario
if c2
2d2 ln 2
≤ c2
(uk−d1+d2) ln 2
< c2
d2 ln 2
, i.e., d1 + d2 ≥ uk > d1.
µ∗ =
c2
(uk − d1 + d2) ln 2
, if d1 + d2 ≥ uk > d1. (21)
Based on the above results, the optimal pricing strategy for the uploader under Case II can
be summarized as
µ∗=


c1
(uk+d1) ln 2
, if d1 ≥ uk > 0,
c2
(uk−d1+d2) ln 2
, if d1 + d2 ≥ uk > d1.
(22)
Remark: It is observed from (22) that the optimal price obtained under Case II can be divided
into two regions based on the uploader’s available bandwidth. We refer to these two regions as
insufficient region and sufficient region. In the insufficient region, the uploader will only accept
the request from peer 1, which is the peer with high ci
di
value. In the sufficient region, the uploader
will allocate peer 1 its maximum download bandwidth. It is observed that the price strategy will
allocate bandwidth to peer 2 only when peer 1 is allocated its full download bandwidth d1. This
is quite different from the scenario in Case I. This phenomenon happens due to the fact that the
peer 1’s ci
di
value is much larger than that of peer 2. 
In summary, the procedure to find the optimal price for the two-peer scenario is given in Fig.
2. It is not difficult to observe that the optimal price is determined by the following two factors:
• The order of the downloaders’ thresholds.
• The uploader’s available upload bandwidth.
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Once these two factors are determined, the optimal price can be easily obtained. From an
economic perspective, the order of the downloaders’ thresholds actually reflect the demand
and the purchasing power (i.e., the available accumulated credits) of the downloaders. The
uploader’s upload bandwidth reflects the market supply. The price of the goods is determined
by the relationship between the supply and demand.
Another key result observed from the above solutions is that the optimal price µ∗ is always
obtained when (15) holds with equality, i.e., ∑i∈Sk fi(µ∗) = uk. This observation is very
important, and plays a significant role in determining the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed
game, which will be discussed later in Subsection 5.3.
2) Multi-peer Scenario: For the multi-peer scenario, there are more cases, and the number
of cases increases with the increase of the number of peers. Thus, in general, we are not able to
obtain a closed-form solution for the multi-peer scenario. However, once the order of the peers’
thresholds is determined, a closed-form solution can be obtained. For the purpose of illustration,
we derive the closed-form solution for P1 when the thresholds of the peers satisfy the following
order c1
d1
> · · · >
c|Sk|
d|Sk|
> c1
2d1
> · · · >
c|Sk|
2d|Sk|
, where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
To avoid trivial solutions, we assume that
∑
i∈Sk
di > uk in the following analysis. Due to the
complexity of fi(µ), P1 is difficult to solve directly. Therefore, to solve P1, we first consider
the following problem
P2: max
µ>0
∑
i∈Sk
µ
(
ci
µ ln 2
− di
)
, (23)
s.t.
∑
i∈Sk
(
ci
µ ln 2
− di
)
≤ uk. (24)
This problem is a convex optimization problem. Therefore, this problem can be solved by
standard convex optimization techniques. Details are omitted here for brevity. The optimal price
µ for P2 can be obtained as follows,
µ =
∑
i∈Sk
ci(
uk +
∑
i∈Sk
di
)
ln 2
. (25)
Now, we relate the optimal solution of P2 to that of P1 in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3: The price µ given in (25) is the optimal solution of P1 if and only if∑
i∈Sk
ci
mini
ci
di
−
∑
i∈Sk
di < uk <
2
∑
i∈Sk
ci
maxi
ci
di
−
∑
i∈Sk
di, (26)
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when mini cidi ≥ maxi
ci
2di
.
Proof: This proof consists of the following two parts.
Part 1: Sufficiency. The optimal price µ∗ given by (25) is the optimal solution of P1 if
ci
2di ln 2
≤ µ < ci
di ln 2
, ∀ i. Substituting (25) into these inequalities yields
∑
i∈Sk
ci
ci
di
−
∑
i∈Sk
di < uk ≤
2
∑
i∈Sk
ci
ci
di
−
∑
i∈Sk
di, ∀ i. Thus, when mini cidi ≥ maxi
ci
2di
, these inequalities can be compactly
written as ∑
i∈Sk
ci
mini
ci
di
−
∑
i∈Sk
di < uk ≤
2
∑
i∈Sk
ci
maxi
ci
di
−
∑
i∈Sk
di. (27)
The “if” part is thus proved. Next, we consider the “only if” part, which is proved by contradiction
as follows.
Part 2: Necessity. For the ease of exposition, we assume that the peers are sorted by the
following order: c1
d1
> · · · >
c|Sk|
d|Sk|
> c1
2d1
> · · · >
c|Sk|
2d|Sk|
. In order to prove the necessity, we
suppose that the price µ∗ given in (25) is optimal even if the inequality given in (26) does not
hold. We consider on possible region for µ∗ below, and a similar proof applies to the other
regions. Suppose uk satisfies the following inequality
∑|Sk|−1
i=1 ci
c|Sk|−1
d|Sk|−1
−
|Sk|−1∑
i=1
di < uk ≤
∑|Sk|
i=1 ci
c|Sk|
d|Sk|
−
|Sk |∑
i=1
di, (28)
and µ∗ given by (25) is still optimal when (28) holds. Since uk ≤
∑|Sk|
i=1 ci/
c|Sk|
d|Sk|
−
∑|Sk|
i=1di, it
follows that c|Sk|
d|Sk|
≤
∑|Sk|
i=1
ci
uk+
∑|Sk|
i=1
di
. Then, according to (25), we have that µ∗ ≥ c|Sk|
d|Sk|
. Then, it follows
from (7) that x|Sk| = 0. This indicates that the peer with the smallest cidi will be excluded from
the game under the above condition.
Then, it follows that µ∗ must be the optimal solution of P1 with |Sk|−1 peers, which is given
as follows
max
µ>0
|Sk|−1∑
i=1
µfi(µ), s.t.
|Sk|−1∑
i=1
fi(µ) ≤ uk. (29)
Thus, under the condition given by (28), using the same way as the proof of the previous “if”
part, it can be shown that the optimal solution for this problem is given by
µ˜∗ =
∑|Sk|−1
i=1 ci(
uk +
∑|Sk|−1
i=1 di
)
ln 2
. (30)
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING 17
It is easy to observe that the optimal price µ˜∗ given in (30) for the above problem is different
from µ∗ given by (25). Thus, this contradicts with our presumption that µ∗ is optimal for P1
with uk satisfying (28). Using the same method, we can prove that µ∗ is not the optimal for P1
for other regions. Therefore, the interference vector µ∗ given by (25) is the optimal solution of
P1 only if uk satisfying (27). The “only if” part thus follows.
By combining the proofs of both the “sufficiency” and “necessity” parts, Proposition 4.3 is
thus proved.
With the results obtained above, we can solve a series of similar sub-problems of P1. Then,
combing these obtained results by the same approach as the two-peer scenario, we can obtain
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2: When the thresholds of the peers satisfy h1 > · · · > h|Sk| > h1/2 > · · · >
h|Sk|/2, where hi , ci/di, the optimal price µ∗ for P1 is then given by
µ∗ =


p|Sk|, if R|Sk| ≥ uk > R|Sk|−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
p2, if R2 ≥ uk > R1
q|Sk|, if R1 ≥ uk > T|Sk|
q|Sk|−1, if T|Sk| ≥ uk > T|Sk|−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
q1, if T2 ≥ uk > T1
, (31)
where qK =
∑
K
i=1
ci
(uk+
∑
K
i=1
di) ln 2
, TK =
∑
K
i=1
ci
hK
−
∑K
i=1di, pK =
∑|Sk|
i=K
ci(
uk−
∑
K−1
i=1
di+
∑|Sk|
i=K
di
)
ln 2
and RK =
2
∑|Sk|
i=K
ci
hK
+
∑K−1
i=1 di −
∑|Sk|
i=Kdi.
For other cases of the multi-peer scenario, closed-form solutions can also be obtained in the
same way. In general, the optimal pricing strategy for the multi-peer scenario can be obtained
by the same procedure illustrated in Fig. 2. For the same type of peer (i.e., the same d), the
optimal pricing scheme tends to allocate more bandwidth to peers with higher contribution (i.e.,
more credits c). This indicates that the obtained pricing strategy for the multi-peer scenario can
provide a strong incentive for peers to cooperate with each other. It is also observed that the
optimal price µ∗ is always obtained when (15) holds with equality, i.e., ∑i∈Sk fi(µ∗) = uk.
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C. Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Proposed Game
In this subsection, we investigate the SE for the proposed Stackelberg game, and show the
SE is unique and Pareto-optimal when uk is given.
With the optimal solution obtained in Theorem 4.1 and 4.2, the SE for the proposed Stackelberg
game is given as follows.
Theorem 4.3: The SE for the Stackelberg game formulated by the uploading game and the
downloading game is (x∗, µ∗), where x∗ is given by (7), and µ∗ is the optimal solution of P1.
Proof: Since µ∗ is the optimal solution of P1, we have Uup (µ∗,x) ≥ Uup (µ,x) for any
given vector x. Thus, it follows that Uup (µ∗,x∗) ≥ Uup (µ,x∗), where x∗ is given by (7).
Similarly, since x∗ is the optimal solution for the downloading game, we have Udowni (x∗i , µ) ≥
Udowni (xi, µ) , ∀i, for any given price µ. Thus, it follows that Udowni (x∗i , µ∗) ≥ Udowni (xi, µ∗) , ∀i.
Then, combining the above two facts, according to the definition of SE given in Definition 3.1,
(x∗, µ∗) is the SE for the proposed Stackelberg game.
Now, we show that the SE is unique and Pareto-optimal when uk is given.
Theorem 4.4: The SE for the proposed Stackelberg game is unique and Pareto-optimal for a
given uk.
Proof: First, we show that the SE for the proposed Stackelberg game is unique for a given
uk. As pointed out in the previous subsection, the optimal pricing strategy is unique when the
order of peers’ thresholds and uk are given. The order of peers’ thresholds is determined by the
values of ci and di, ∀i, which are fixed during each implementation of the Stackelberg game.
Thus, it is clear that the optimal price µ∗ is unique for a given uk. On the other hand, it is
observed from (7) that the download bandwidth for each peer is unique under a given µ. Thus,
it is obvious that the SE for the proposed game is unique under a given uk.
Now, we show that the SE is Pareto-optimal for a given uk. Given an initial resource allocation
scheme among a group of peers, a change to a different allocation scheme that makes at least
one peer better off without making any other peers worse off is called a Pareto improvement.
An allocation scheme is defined as ”Pareto-optimal” when no further Pareto improvements can
be made. In other words, in a Pareto-optimal equilibrium, no one can be made better off without
making at least one individual worse off. It is observed that the optimal µ∗ always satisfies∑
i∈Sk
fi(µ
∗) = uk. Thus, increasing one peer’s (e.g., peer 1) bandwidth allocation will inevitably
decrease another peer’s (e.g. peer 2) bandwidth allocation. This makes peer 2’s bandwidth
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allocation deviates from its optimal bandwidth allocation, and consequentially decreasing its
utility. Thus, no peer can be made better off without making some other peer worse off, and the
SE is Pareto-optimal.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STACKELBERG GAME IN P2P STREAMING NETWORKS
In previous section, we have solved the proposed Stackelberg game and obtained its SE. In
this section, we investigate how to implement the proposed game in P2P networks in detail. Two
implementation methods referred to as direct implementation and bargaining implementation are
proposed and investigated as below.
A. Direct Implementation
Direct implementation is strictly based on the obtained results given in Section V. It is a
one-round implementation with four stages, which are described as follows.
• Stage 1: All the peers requesting data from the uploader send their contribution values ci
and download bandwidth limits di to the uploader.
• Stage 2: Having received the data requests together with the information of ci and di from
all the peers, the uploader first sorts all the peer in the order c1
d1
> · · · >
c|Sk|
d|Sk|
, and determines
the order of peers’ thresholds. Then, the uploader computes the optimal price µ∗ using the
same approach as illustrated in Fig. 2, and broadcasts the optimal price µ∗ to all the peers.
• Stage 3: Based on the received price, each peer computes its optimal download bandwidth
x∗i based on (7), and sends the calculated results to the uploader.
• Stage 4: The uploader allocates the bandwidth based on x∗i , ∀i ∈ Sk and starts streaming.
B. Bargaining Implementation
In this subsection, we propose the bargaining implementation for the proposed Stackelberg
game based on the characteristics of P1. It can be shown that P1 is equivalent to the following
problem
P3: max
µ>0
µ, (32)
s.t.
∑
i∈Sk
fi(µ) = uk. (33)
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Fig. 3. Implementation in P2P Streaming Networks: (a) Direct implementation (b) Bargaining implementation
Then, we propose the bargaining implementation based on the following two facts: (i). fi(µ)
is a decreasing function of µ, which can be observed from (7). (ii). The upper limit of µ∗ is
maxi
ci
di ln 2
. This can be proved using the same approach as Proposition 4.1.
• Stage 1: The uploader sets an initial price µ (where µ ≥ maxi cidi ln 2), and broadcasts it to
all the downloaders.
• Stage 2: Each downloader computes its optimal download bandwidth xi based on (7) for
the given µ, and send back xi to the uploader.
• Stage 3: Having received xi from all the peers, the uploader computes the total demand∑
i∈Sk
xi, and compares the total demand with its upload bandwidth uk. Assume that ǫ is
a small positive constant that controls the algorithm accuracy. If
∑
i∈Sk
xi < uk − ǫ, the
uploader decreases the bandwidth price by ∆µ, where ∆µ is a small step size. After that,
the uploader broadcasts the new price to all the downloaders.
• Stage 4: Stage 2 and Stage 3 are repeated until |
∑
i∈Sk
xi − uk| < ǫ. Then, the uploader
starts streaming.
The convergence of the bargaining algorithm is guaranteed by the following facts: (i). The
optimal price µ∗ is always obtained when the upload bandwidth of the uploader is fully allocated,
i.e.,
∑
i∈Sk
xi = uk. (ii). fi(µ) is a decreasing function of µ. (iii). The SE for the proposed
Stackelberg game is unique and Pareto-optimal for a given uk.
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C. Direct Implementation Vs. Bargaining Implementation
In this subsection, we analyze and compare the difference between these two kinds of imple-
mentation schemes.
It is not difficult to observe that the direct implementation is time-saving, since it only needs
one-round to determine the optimal bandwidth price and the optimal download bandwidth of
the peers. In contrast, the bargaining implementation requires much more time. This is due
to the fact that the uploader and the downloaders have to go through a multi-round bargaining
process to finally reach the equilibrium. Thus, for delay-sensitive service, such as P2P multimedia
streaming, direct implementation is preferred.
Another difference between these two implementation schemes is the requirement on the
computing power of the uploader. It is observed that direct implementation requires the uploader
to directly compute the optimal price based on the procedure given in Section V-B, which is a
complex procedure involving a lot of cases. Thus, it has a high requirement on the computing
power of the uploader. In contrast, the bargaining implementation greatly relieves the computation
burden on the uploader. The uploader only needs to compare the total demand with its upload
bandwidth, which requires much less computing power. Thus, the bargaining implementation
should be preferred by the handheld mobile devices with less computing power.
It is worthy pointing out that no matter which implementation scheme is employed, the same
Stackelberg equilibrium results for the same set data. This is due to the fact that the SE is unique
which is proved in Theorem 4.4.
VII. DEALING WITH DYNAMICS OF P2P STREAMING NETWORKS
P2P networks are dynamic in nature. Peers may leave or join the network at any time. How
the equilibrium changes when peers leave or join the network is of great importance to the
study of a dynamic network. Thus, in this subsection, we investigate whether the equilibrium
will change and how it will change under these situations.
When a peer joins the network, it is given a certain number of credits. The initial credits for
each peer can be the same (e.g., 100 credits for each peer) or different (e.g., ci for peer i). The
credits of a peer is updated after each transaction. One transaction means that a downloading
peer finished its downloading from a uploader. After one transaction of downloader i, its credits
ci is updated by ci = ci−µ∗xi, and the credits of the uploader j is updated by cj = cj+µ∗xi. If
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multiple downloader finish their downloading at the same time, the uploader updates its credits
by collecting credits from them together.
To facilitate the analysis, we assume that there are N downloading peers and 1 uploading peer
at the original SE. The original SE is denoted by (µ∗,x∗), where x∗ is the optimal bandwidth
allocation vector for the downloading peers at the SE. The new SE after peers leaving or joining
the network is denoted by (µ˜∗, x˜∗). Besides, we assume that the information that a downloader
leaves or joins the network is only available to the uploader itself, and it will not share the
information with other downloaders.
A. Peers Leaving the P2P Streaming Network
When a peer j leaves a P2P streaming network, the SE changes only when
Uup(µ˜∗, x˜∗) ≥ Uup (µ∗,x∗)− Uup (µ∗, xj) , (34)
where Uup(µ˜∗, x˜∗) denotes the utility of the uploader at the new SE, Uup (µ∗,x∗) denotes the
utility of the uploader at the original SE, and Uup (µ∗, xj) denotes peer j’s contribution to the
uploader’s utility at the original SE.
For the problem considered in this paper, the inequality (34) always holds. Thus, when a
downloading peer leaves the network, the best strategy is to re-implement the Stackelberg game
with the remaining N − 1 peers.
B. Peers Joining the P2P Streaming Network
When a peer joins the network, the SE changes only when
Uup(µ˜∗, x˜∗) > Uup (µ∗,x∗) . (35)
When a peer joins the network, the number of competing peers increases. As the competition
between downloading peers becomes fiercer, the uploading peer has the incentive to increase the
price of the resource to increase its revenue. It is worth pointing out that (35) does not always
hold. For example, if the ci/di value of the joining peer is very small, this peer will be rejected,
and the SE will be sustained.
A simple way to re-attain the equilibrium is to completely re-implement the Stackelberg game
again with the N + 1 peers. This method is guaranteed to reach a new SE which is unique and
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Fig. 4. Bandwidth allocation vs. Price under same connection types
Pareto-optimal. From the uploader’s perspective, this method is beneficial since the new SE
will never decrease its utility. The uploader need only recompute the price µ∗ of the resource,
taking the new peer’s ci and di into consideration, and broadcasts the calculated µ∗new to all the
N+1 peers. Though this method is good for the uploader, it sacrifices the existing downloaders’
interests. This is due to the fact that
∑
i∈Sk
xi = uk always holds at the equilibrium. If a new
peer joins and is allocated a certain amount of download bandwidth, some of the existing peers’
download bandwidth must decrease. For some peers, even though their download bandwidth
may not decrease, their utility decreases due to the increase of the resource price.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, several numerical examples are provided to evaluate the performance of the
proposed incentive resource allocation scheme. It is shown that the proposed resource allocation
scheme can provide strong incentives for peers to contribute to the P2P network.
A. Example 1: Peers with the same connection type but different contribution values
In this example, we assume that there are four peers requesting data chunks from the uploader
k. The connection types of all the requesting peers are assumed to be the same, and their
maximum download bandwidth are d1 = d2 = d3 = d4 = 150. The contribution values of these
requesting peers at the current time are [c1, c2, c3, c4] = [100, 150, 200, 250]. The bandwidth
assignments for the four downloading peers under different prices are shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 5. Bandwidth allocation vs. Price under same contribution values
It is observed from Fig. 4 that the bandwidth assigned to each peer decreases with the increase
of the price. For the same price, although all the peers have the same connection type, peers with
larger contribution values are assigned higher bandwidth under our resource allocation strategy.
This illustrates that the proposed resource allocation strategy can provide differentiated service
to peers with different contribution, and thus encourage peers to contribute to the network.
B. Example 2: Peers with the same contribution value but different connection types
In this example, we assume that there are four peers requesting data chunks from the uploader
k. We assume the contribution values of the requesting peers are the same, and are given by
[c1, c2, c3, c4] = [150, 150, 150, 150]. The connection types of the requesting peers are assumed to
be different, and are given by [d1, d2, d3, d4] = [100, 150, 200, 250]. The bandwidth assignments
for this setup are shown in Fig. 5.
It is observed from Fig. 5 that when the price is low, every peer can download at its maximum
download bandwidth. The bandwidth assigned to each peer decreases with the increase of the
price. It is also observed that our resource allocation scheme biases toward peers with smaller
download capacities. This is as expected. Intuitively, given the same unit of bandwidth resource,
a peer with a smaller download capacity achieves a higher performance satisfaction factor than
a peer with a larger download capacity.
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C. Example 3: Relationship between bandwidth allocation and the available upload bandwidth
In this example, we assume that there are four peers requesting data chunks from the uploader
k. The connection types of all the requesting peers are assumed to be the same, and their
maximum download bandwidths are d1 = d2 = d3 = d4 = 150. The contribution values of these
requesting peers at the current time are [c1, c2, c3, c4] = [100, 150, 200, 250]. The bandwidth
assignments for the four downloading peers under uk are shown in Fig. 6. It is observed from
Fig. 6 that our resource allocation scheme gives a higher priority to peers with higher contribution
in bandwidth assignment. When the available upload bandwidth uk is small, the uploader will
reject the request from the peers with low contribution, and provide the limited resource to the
peers with high contribution. When the available upload bandwidth uk is large, the uploader
will try to meet every peer’s request. However, peers with higher contribution values are given
a higher priority in obtaining the bandwidth. It is also observed that with the increasing of uk,
the bandwidth assigned for each peer increases. This is due to the fact that the uploader’s utility
is maximized only when it contributes all its available upload bandwidth.
D. Example 4: Join of Competing Peers
In this example, for the purpose of comparison, we use the same system setup and simulation
parameters as [29]. We assume the uploader’s available bandwidth uk is 2 Mb/s. There are
four competing peers requesting data chunks from the uploader k. The connection types of the
requesting peers are assumed to be different, and are given by [d1, d2, d3, d4] = [2, 1.5, 1, 0.5] (in
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Fig. 7. Instantaneous Bandwidth Allocations: Join of Competing Peers
Mb/s). The arrival times of these peers are t = 20, 40, 60 and 80s, respectively. The contribution
values of these requesting peers are assumed to be [c1, c2, c3, c4] = [400, 300, 200, 100]. The
results are obtained using the bargaining implementation. The initial value for µ is µ(0) =
maxi
ci
di ln 2
= 288.539. The step size for µ is chosen as 0.01, and ǫ is chosen as 0.001.
It is observed from Fig. 7 that the equilibrium of the game changes whenever a new com-
peting peer joins the game. The bandwidth allocation for the existing peers decrease due to the
newcomer. This is in accordance with our analysis given in Section VII-B. It is also observed
that the uploader assigns all its bandwidth without reservation at each new equilibrium. Besides,
at each equilibrium, the bandwidth allocation is proportional to the contribution value of each
peer. This indicates that the proposed incentive mechanism is adaptive to the dynamics of the
P2P network, and can always provide differentiated service to peers with different contribution
values. It is also observed that the proposed scheme can achieve the same performance as that
of [29].
E. Example 5: Leave of Competing Peers
In this example, we consider an opposite scenario of Example 4. We consider the scenario
that peers leave the system one by one. For the convenience of analysis, we use the same
system setup and simulation parameters as example 4. We assume that the four peers join the
network at t = 20s, and they leave the network one by one. The leave times of peer 4, 3, 2 are
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Fig. 8. Instantaneous Bandwidth Allocations: Leave of Competing Peers
t = 40, 60, 80s, respectively.
From Fig. 8, it is observed that the equilibrium of the game changes whenever a competing
peer leaves the network. The bandwidth allocation for the existing peers increase due to the leave
of peers. This is in accordance with our analysis given in Section VII-A. It is also observed
that the bandwidth assignment is proportional to the contribution value of each peer at each
equilibrium. This indicates that the proposed incentive mechanism is robust to the dynamics of
the P2P network, and can always provide differentiated service to peers with different contribution
values. It is also interesting to observe that the equilibriums of Example 5 are exactly the same
as those of the Example 4 for the same number of peers. This is due to fact that the uploader’s
utility obtained by selling the remaining bandwidth to the remaining peers is larger than that
obtained by maintaining the current status in this example.
IX. DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A. Competition among Multiple Uploaders
In this paper, we consider a simple model where there is one uploader and multiple down-
loaders. In reality, there may exist multiple uploaders having overlapping data chunks. This
implies that there may exist a competition among these uploaders, which may affect the pricing
strategies of the uploaders. Our incentive mechanism can be applied to this scenario with few
modifications.
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The presence of multiple uploaders induces a subgame that involves the peers choosing
the uploaders. This adds an additional ”Step 0: Peers choose their uploader.” to the proposed
algorithms. Given any set of choices by the peers, a Stackelberg game is induced at each uploader,
which can be solved for a unique SE according to the analysis done in previous sections. Thus,
the key issue is how to choose the uploaders. When a new peer joins the network, it has to
choose one uploader from multiple uploaders that have its desired data chunks. The prices at
these uploaders observed by the newcomer at this moment are fixed. Thus, it is reasonable for
the newcomer to choose the uploader with the lowest price.
However, it is worth pointing out that this scheme is in general suboptimal. This is due to the
fact that the price at the new SE with the newcomer may not be the same as the price at the
old SE without the newcomer. Thus, it is possible that the newcomer unilaterally deviate in its
choice of the uploader to achieve a higher utility. If we take this into consideration, the game
will become very complex and highly difficult to analyze. Thus, we would like to delegate this
to our future work.
B. Trust Issues
In this paper, we focus on designing an incentive mechanism for P2P networks. However, it
is worth pointing out that trust issues are also very important for P2P systems. For example, the
proposed algorithms need the downloading peers to report their ci’s and di’s to the uploader.
Malicious peers may misreport their credits ci’s and their types di’s to gain advantages against
other peers. For example, a malicious peer may deliberately reports a bandwidth d˜i smaller than
its real demand bandwidth di to increase its priority (ci/di) in obtaining bandwidth.
Another security issue is that malicious peers may deliberately upload polluted data chunks
to other peers. Without effective measures to identify malicious peers, the polluted data chunks
could be disseminated to the whole network more quickly in a P2P network with incentive
mechanisms than that without incentive mechanisms. This is due to the fact that peers are
motivated to upload data chunks to each other to earn points or monetary rewards in a P2P
system with incentive mechanisms. Without the ability to identify malicious peers, peers are
more likely to forward polluted data chunks, consequently degrading the performance of the
system.
To deal with these trust issues, trust management schemes are needed to identify and defend
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against malicious peers. In other words, incentive mechanisms must be used in trusted environ-
ments or together with reliable trust management mechanisms. Though trust management for P2P
networks has been extensively studied in literature [34]–[40], joint design of trust management
and incentive mechanisms for P2P networks remains unstudied. Due to the complexity and the
lack of space, we leave this as our future work.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a credit-based incentive mechanism to stimulate the cooperation between peers
in a P2P streaming network is proposed. Taking the peers’ heterogeneity and selfish nature into
consideration, a Stackelberg game is designed to provide incentives and service differentiation for
peers with different credits and connection types. The optimal pricing and purchasing strategies,
which can jointly maximize the uploader’s and the downloaders’ utility functions, are derived by
solving the Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg equilibrium is shown to be unique and Pareto-
optimal. Then, two fully distributed implementation schemes are proposed and studied. It is
shown that each of these schemes has its own advantages. The impact of peer churn on the
proposed incentive mechanism is then analyzed. It is shown that the proposed mechanism can
adapt to dynamic events such as peers joining or leaving the network. Finally, several numerical
examples are presented, which show that the proposed incentive mechanism is effective in
encouraging peers to cooperate with each other.
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